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Note
Substantive Due Process in Nebraska
Gillette Dairy, Inc. v. Nebraska Dairy Products Board,
192 Neb. 89, 219 N.W.2d 214 (1974).
In Gillette Dairy, Inc. v. Nebraska Dairy Products Board' the
constitutionality of setting minimum prices for dairy products in
Nebraska was challenged. The plaintiff, a dairy located in north-
eastern Nebraska, contended the Dairy Industry Trade Products
Act 2 violated the Nebraska Constitution because (1) it deprived the
dairy of liberty and property without due process of law; and (2)
it was an illegal delegation of legislative powers. 3
The purpose of the act was to prevent unfair trade practices
which were believed to be forcing dairies out of business. If left
1. 192 Neb. 89, 219 N.W.2d 214 (1974).
2. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-263.37-.38, .41-.49 (Reissue 1971); NEB. REv. STAT.
§§ 81-263.39-.40 (Supp. 1974), while the statutes creating the Nebraska
Dairy Products Board are found in NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-263.81-.83, .85-
.86 (Reissue 1971); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-263.84 (Supp. 1974).
3. The plaintiff urged that the Act violated article I, §§ 1, 3, 21 and 25,
article II, and article III, § 1 of the Constitution of the State of Ne-
braska. Brief of appellant at 4. The text of the pertinent sections is:
All persons are by nature free and independent, and have
certain inherent and inalienable rights; among these are life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness.... NEB. CoNST. art. I,
§ 1.
No persons shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. Id. § 3.
The property of no person shall be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation therefor. Id. § 21.
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair
or deny others, retained by the people, and all powers not
herein delegated, remain with the people. Id. § 26.
The court capsulized the plaintiff's contentions in six areas:
1. The act grants the defendants authority which exceeds
the constitutional police power provided for the state by
the Constitution.
2. The public interest is not so affected that the use of po-
lice power by the state is warranted.
3. The act fosters monopolistic milk practices.
4. The act is arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory in
regulating the price of dairy products.
5. The act illegally delegates legislative powers to the Ne-
braska Dairy Products Board and to the Department of
Agriculture of the State of Nebraska.
6. The act illegally deprives the plaintiff of certain consti-
tutionally guaranteed property rights.
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uncontrolled it was thought that price cutting would jeopardize the
public interest of obtaining a sufficient supply of milk at a reason-
able price.4 "Price wars" were to be prevented by making it un-
lawful "[t]o sell or offer to sell within the state any dairy product
for less than the minimum basic cost . . . ."5 The Nebraska Su-
preme Court concluded that the statutes violated the due process
clause and were therefore unconstitutional,6 but declined to extend
the holding to include an illegal delegation of powers.7
I.
A proper analysis of Gillette depends upon understanding the
place this decision occupies in the context of reviewing economic
regulation. For that reason a short history of federal decisions
precedes the discussion of Nebraska cases.
In the context of economic regulations, judicial interpretation
of "without due process of law" is extremely broad. In Lochner v.
New York s the United States Supreme Court held a state labor law
limiting bakery employees to a sixty hour work week unconstitu-
tional. An argument based on safeguarding the health of the em-
ployees was dismissed as unreasonable.9 The Court continued to
4. NEB. Rav. STAT. § 81-263.38 (Reissue 1971), reads:
It is hereby declared that the sale of dairy products is a
business affecting the public health and welfare and affected
with a public interest. Certain trade practices are now being
carried on in the sale of dairy products which are unfair and
unjust, which have already driven numerous firms out of
business, and which if continued will jeopardize the public in-
terest in securing a sufficient supply of properly prepared
dairy products and in Ipreserving the dairy industry of this
state free from monopolistic and anticompetitive influences. It
is the purpose of sections 81-263.37 to 81-263.49 and 81-263.81
to 81-263.86 to use the police power of the state in order to
promote the public interest so declared by outlawing the con-
tinuance of such trade practices.
5. NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-263.41 (Reissue 1971). MVinimum basic cost is a
weighted average to be determined by the Dairy Products Board from
standards set forth in the act. Id. at § 81-263.84 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
6. 192 Neb. at 99, 219 N.W.2d at 221. Two bills were introduced in the
first session of the eighty-fourth legislature to deal with the uncon-
stitutionality of the present statutes. L.B. 324 proposed a repeal of
the entire act while L.B. 406 proposed amendments which closely
followed the court's suggested method of achieving a constitutional
solution. L.B. 324 was passed and signed by the governor. See note
37 infra and accompanying text.
7. Id. at 102, 219 N.W.2d at 222. A discussion of the delegation of powers
issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
8. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
9. Id. at 58. Justice Holmes, in a dissenting opinion, emphasized the irra-
tionality of basing a decision upon an economic theory not supported
by the Constitution. Id. at 74-76. His dissent foreshadowed the view
the Court would adopt in later years when he wrote:
I think that the word liberty" in the fourteenth amendment
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guard individual property rights from state encroachment by re-
quiring states to justify the relationship of the regulation to the
public welfare. 10
This attitude began to change in Nebbia v. New York 1 where a
closely divided Court upheld the right of the state to impose price
fixing on the retail sale of milk" as a regulation reasonably de-
signed to assure the community a supply of milk. Three years
later in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish2 the Court upheld a state
minimum wage law covering women and minors. The presump-
tion of constitutionality of legislative declarations was thus estab-
lished in economic due process cases. Since that time the Court
has not overturned any economic legislation on due process
grounds.
Subsequent opinions of the Court have strengthened the pre-
sumption of constitutionality's so that presently the standard is
whether the legislature could rationally believe that the regulation
is a means to a legitimate end.
14
The judicial review of economic regulation has taken a separate
course in the state courts. Many state courts have refused to up-
hold the validity of economic regulations based upon the construc-
tion of their own state constitutions. This ends the matter in most
cases since no federal question is raised for review.
is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome
of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational
and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute would
infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood
by the traditions of our people and our law. It does not need
research to show that no such sweeping condemnation can be
passed upon the statute before us. A reasonable man might
think it a proper measure on the score of health.
Id. at 76. See note 45 and accompanying text infra.
10. See Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due
Process of Law, 53 Nw. U.L. RPv. 13, 22 (1958).
11. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). For a comprehensive discussion of milk control
regulations, see Mangum, Milk Control Laws in the United States, 38
N.C.L. REV. 419 (1960). For a general economic analysis of their ef-
fect, see A. PHILLnPS, AMRET STRuCTURE, ORGANIZATION AND PERoM-
ANcE 80-90 (1962).
12. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
13. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri,
342 U.S. 421 (1952).
14. "We cannot say that the regulation has no rational relation to that ob-
jective and therefore beyond constitutional bounds." 348 U.S. at 491.
See also D. ENGDAmR, CoNsTmunoNAL POwER: FEDERAL AND STATE IN
A NUTsHELL 254 (1974), where one reason for the standard is dis-
cussed:
The reason that the criterion has-been made no more stringent
than this is not merely that state legislatures are more compe-
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This was exemplified in 1941 when the United States Supreme
Court overruled the Nebraska Supreme Court in Olsen v. Nebras-
ka.15 The court held that a state statute fixing the maximum com-
pensation a private employment agency might charge was not
unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment due process
clause. A second suit was brought in Boomer v. OlsenWs to enjoin
prosecution under the same law, this time asking for a determina-
tion of unconstitutionality based upon the Nebraska Constitution.
The trial court held the statute unconstitutional. The Nebraska Su-
preme Court affirmed based upon evidence which tended to show
that the plaintiff's business could not be maintained on the maxi-
mum fixed fee allowed.17 This, together with a finding that there
was lack of public interest in employment agencies, persuaded the
court that the statute was unreasonable.
This analysis was continued in Lincoln Dairy Co. v. FinneganWs
where the plaintiff asked for a declaratory judgment on the con-
stitutionality of an act prohibiting the sale of milk not labeled and
produced as Grade A. The act was found to be unreasonable based
upon strong evidence' 9 that the plaintiff's milk was wholesome,
nutritious, healthful and fit for human consumption 2 0 In both of
these cases substantial evidence was presented by the plaintiff
tending to show the law was unreasonable in fact.
An analysis of these decisions discloses at least three standards
which a state court might apply in reviewing economic regulations:
(1) placing the burden of justification upon the state; (2) following
the federal decisions which uphold the regulation if a rational ba-
sis could have been assumed, a nearly conclusive presumption of
constitutionality; or (3) a middle ground that includes a presump-
tion of constitutionality which may be refuted upon inquiry into
the reasonableness in fact of the regulations.
21
II.
Gillette presented the Nebraska Supreme Court with an oppor-
tunity to clarify the basis and limits of judicial review of economic
tent than federal courts to make the sort of factual determi-
nation of telic relation that is called for; rather, the primary
reason is the Court's discountenance of any greater federal in-
terference in matters of state concern than is clearly necessary
to protect federal or individual interests which the Constitu-
tion secures.
15. 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
16. 143 Neb. 579, 10 N.W.2d 507 (1943).
17. Id. at 584-85, 10 N.W.2d at 510-11.
18. 170 Neb. 777, 104 N.W.2d 227 (1960).
19. Id. at 785, 104 N.W.2d at 233.
20. Id. at 788, 104 N.W.2d at 234.
21. See 15 STAN. L. Rav. 309, 316 (1963).
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regulations. The majority opinion sets out the standard for review
as adopted in previous Nebraska cases. It acknowledges legislative
discretion in determining the means of economic regulation,
22
thus establishing the presumption of constitutionality. The stand-
ard of review to be applied was enunciated in Lincoln Dairy:
"Measures adopted by the legislature to protect the public health
and secure the public welfare must have some reasonable relation
to those proposed ends.
'2 8
In analyzing Gillette one must ask how well the court followed
its own standards. The answer is to be found initially by looking
at the purpose of the act as declared by the legislature:
Certain trade practices are now being carried on .. . which have
already driven numerous firms out of business, and which if con-
tinued will jeopardize the public interest in securing a sufficient
supply of properly prepared dairy products and in preserving the
dairy industry of this state free from monopolistic and anticom-
petitive influences.
24
There is some evidence in the record supporting the existence of a
monopoly. "The record establishes that in 1950 Nebraska had 151
milk processors and ice cream manufacturers, in 1963 that number
had dropped to 55, in 1972 the number was 17."25 The state pre-
sented additional factual support indicating the need for such regu-
lation,26 including the dangers inherent in allowing unrestricted
price cutting.2 7 In spite of this evidence the court held: "We con-
clude the act is unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious in that it
purports to fix a minimum basic cost that bears no relation to, and
22. "Whether a business is charged with such a public interest as to war-
rant its regulation is a legislative question in which the courts ordi-
narily will not interfere." 192 Neb. at 96, 219 N.W.2d at 219 (quoting
Boomer v. Olsen, 143 Neb. 579, 10 N.W.2d 507 (1943).
23. 192 Neb. at 97, 219 N.W.2d at 219.
24. NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-263.38 (Reissue 1971).
25. 192 Neb. at 104-05, 219 N.W.2d at 223 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
26. Brief for Appellee at 8-9.
27. The Legislature concluded and the evidence supports the
proposition that this situation [the decrease in the number of
processors] resulted from "milk wars" particularly in popu-
lous eastern Nebraska. Expert witnesses through affidavit
testified that if "milk wars" are allowed to continue they
"could destroy many full service dairies with the result that
the consumers and dairy farmers would be hurt as well as full
service processors in the price war markets."
192 Neb. at 105, 219 N.W.2d at 223-24 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
It is ironic that the small, local processor which the court claims
to be protecting is the most susceptible to price wars. It is the na-
tionally based processor that is able to cut prices in a small area while
sales from other outlets are used to offset the temporary loss of reve-
nue. See generally 19 S.C.L. Rsv. 389, 397 (1967) discussing the effect
of a milk price war in South Carolina.
DUE PROCESS
is not justified by any requirements of the public interest."2 8 The
holding is best explained by noting the lack of a presumption of
constitutionality.29 The court dismissed the declared purpose with-
out mentioning the supporting evidence submitted by the state, in-
ferring that the act's real effect would be to foster monopoly.80 The
majority preferred to approach the problem from the perspective
of the danger of price regulation and the resulting need for justifi-
cation.31
This failure to come to grips with the issues is further empha-
sized by the conclusionary nature of the language used throughout
the opinion.3 2 That which appeared "obvious" to the court is often
unsupported by the record 3 leading one to believe that much of
what was said was based on economic beliefs not shared with the
legislature.
The court reasoned that an individual prohibition against each
processor selling below his cost of production would provide the
same benefits without the present objections.34 Whether prohibi-
tions of the sort described would prevent monopoly remains un-
clear. It is clear however that a decision upon the most appropri-
ate means to accomplish a particular result is a legislative func-
tion. The legislature may have been concerned with the adminis-
trative cost of determining and enforcing individual standards, or
28. 192 Neb. at 99, 219 N.W.2d at 221 (emphasis added).
29. The presumption of constitutionality, although not explicitly acknowl-
edged in Gillette, note 22 supra, is widely expressed in Nebraska deci-
sions. Annot. 3A NEB. Dir. 470 (1959).
30. 192 Neb.at 96, 219 N.W.2d at 219.
31. The test in this state for price fixing is at least two-fold:
First, devotion to a public use; and, second, circumstances
where the public interest requires a monopoly to exist in order
to prevent costly duplication of facilities at the expense of the
ultimate consumer.
192 Neb. at 99, 219 N.W.2d at 220.
32. I submit ... that the recital in the opinion six separate times
that certain key conclusions are either "obvious" or "appar-
ent" are neither obvious nor apparent, have no evidentiary
support, and depend on the a priori acceptance of certain eco-
nomic views as to what type of competition is desirable in the
milk processing and distributing industry and what the effects
of the act will be.
192 Neb. at 103-04, 219 N.W.2d at 223 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
33. The only evidence introduced by the plaintiff is that shown
in affidavits which are exhibits 13, 14 and 15. The essence of
exhibit 13 is expressed in the following conclusion: Therefore
plaintiff and his competitors can only compete on the follow-
ing items: Types of produce packaging, advertising, quality
of service, and the shelf price of the finished product. Ex-
hibits 14 and 15 seem to support the conclusion that the 1962
to 1972 gasoline price stayed the same where dairy products
went up.
192 Neb. at 103, 219 N.W.2d at 223 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 96, 219 N.W.2d at 218.
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it may have found such a system to be unworkable. But it is the
legislature that is equipped to determine the appropriate solution.
The court only has evidence available concerning one possible
means and should restrict itself to reviewing the reasonableness of
that particular remedy.
The plaintiff emphasized that a prohibition against selling be-
low an average cost was discriminatory because it deprived him of
the ability to increase sales by selling at a lower price than his
less efficient competitors. 35 Consequently, the majority opinion
divided processors into two groups, "efficient" and "inefficient."
36
While the use of a weighted average to determine cost does
break the class of processors into two groups, it is more accurate to
refer to them as those with greater than average costs and those
with less than average costs. Efficiency is only one of the fac-
tors which decides into which group a processor will fall. Another
element is volume purchasing. The important consideration in the
eyes of the legislature is that the impairment of some processors'
rights to set prices is outweighed by the public benefit of having
a secure milk supply at a reasonable price.3 7 It is the reasonable-
ness of this belief, taking into account any impairment of individ-
ual rights, which the court must determine.
A direct comparison with Boomer emphasizes that the Gillette
decision should be viewed as a severe departure from previous
cases. In Boomer the plaintiff was required to present strong evi-
dence to overcome the presumption of constitutionality. In con-
trast the plaintiff in Gillette submitted very little in the way of
substantive evidence, while the state presented considerable evi-
dence to support the act.38 The clear indication is that legislation
invoking price regulation is not presumed constitutional but rather
requires the state to overcome a burden of justification.
35. Brief of Appellant at 5.
36. 192 Neb. at 94-95, 219 N.W.2d at 21.
37. If the purpose of the Act were merely to secure a sufficient supply
of milk its reasonableness would seem uncertain because no showing
was made that a very few processors could not satisfy the public de-
mand. However, evidence was also presented of the likelihood of a
dislocation of the milk supply at its source, a proposition which could
lead to at least short-term deficiencies in supply. See note 22 supra.
The more pervasive danger seems to be the possibility that in a mo-
nopoly situation milk prices need not remain competitive.
38. See notes 17, 27, and 33 supra. Plaintiff offered no direct proof that
it would be injured by the Act. Unless actual data showing the effects
of price regulation on the plaintiff were to be submitted, any statement
made on the subject is purely speculative.
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I.
The elaboration of well reasoned standards for judicial review
is particularly important in an area where the federal Constitu-
tion is construed differently from the state constitution. The
conflict which exists in reviewing statutes on due process grounds
originates in the separation of the legislative and judicial branches
of government. The state constitution charges elected legislators
with determining appropriate means of regulation. The power of
judicial review is limited to securing compliance with that consti-
tution. The refusal of the United States Supreme Court to review
state economic regulations on substantive grounds clearly illus-
trates the conflict,39 which even advocates of closer review ac-
knowledge.4
0
There are reasons, peculiar to the states, which favor closer re-
view. State legislatures often have relatively short sessions where
lawmakers may be subjected to intense lobbying by special inter-
est groups.41 This is particularly true in Nebraska, where the
checks of a two-house legislature are not present. Advocates for
closer review argue that the democratic process is not foreclosed
because in most states, constitutional amendment is relatively
easy.42 Whatever the extent of the review, it is the courts' func-
tion clearly to elaborate the standards and apply them to the facts.
Professor Paul Freund discussed the rationality of judicial deci-
sions by stating: "[Rationality] is a warrant not so much of the
soundness of a decision as of the course pursued-that the course
of inquiry has been kept open and operating in appropriate ways
and within appropriate termini. ''43
39. We refuse to sit as a "superlegislature to weigh the wisdom
of legislation," and we emphatically refuse to go back to the
time when courts used the Due Process Clause "to strike down
state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions,
because they may be unwise, improvident or out of harmony
with a particular school of thought." Nor are we willing to
draw lines by calling a law 'prohibitory" or "regulatory".
Whether the legislature takes for its textbook Adam Smith,
Herbert Spencer, Lord Keynes, or some other is no concern
of ours.
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963) (citations omitted).
40. See Hetherington, supra note 15, at 249.
41. Id. at 248-251.
42. Supra note 21, at 390. The Constitution of the State of Nebraska may
be amended upon proposal by three-fifths of the legislature followed
by a majority vote at the next election of legislators provided that it
receives at least thirty-five per cent of the total votes cast. NEB.
CoxsT. art. XVI, § 1.
43. P. EuND, ON LAW AND JusTics 64 (1968).
434 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 54, NO. 2 (1975)
IV. CONCLUSION
When viewed objectively it appears an inquiry into the reason-
ableness in fact of the act combined with a presumption of consti-
tutionality might have produced a different decision in Gillette.
It must be assumed therefore that at least in the area of price reg-
ulation, the state has a burden of justification which must be over-
come before the constitutionality of an act is upheld. The failure
of the court to follow its own standards for review results in need-
less uncertainty in an already difficult area.
Randall C. Hanson, '76
